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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we claim that cyclic obfuscation, when properly imple-
mented, poses exponential complexity on SAT or CycSAT attack. The
CycSAT, in order to generate the necessary cycle avoidance clauses,
uses a pre-processing step. We show that this pre-processing step has
to compose its cycle avoidance condition on all cycles in a netlist, oth-
erwise, a missing cycle could trap the SAT solver in an infinite loop
or force it to return an incorrect key. Then, we propose several tech-
niques bywhich the number of cycles is exponentially increased with
respect to the number of inserted feedbacks. We further illustrate
that when the number of feedbacks is increased, the pre-processing
step of CycSAT faces an exponential increase in complexity and run-
time, preventing the correct composition of loop avoidance clauses
in a reasonable time before invoking the SAT solver. On the other
hand, if the pre-processing is not completed properly, the SAT solver
will get stuck or return incorrect key. Hence, when the cyclic ob-
fuscation in accordance to the conditions proposed in this paper
is implemented, it would impose an exponential complexity with
respect to the number of inserted feedback, even when the CycSAT
solution is used.
1 INTRODUCTION
The cost of building a new semiconductor fab was estimated to be
$5.0 billion in 2015, with large recurring maintenance costs [5][7],
and sharply increases as technology migrates to smaller nodes. Due
to the high cost of building, operating, managing, and maintaining
state-of-the-art silicon manufacturing facilities, many major U.S.
high-tech companies have been always fabless or went fabless in
recent years (e.g., AMD, Broadcom, Marvell, Nvidia, Qualcomm, and
Xilinx, to name a few). Thus, to reduce the fabrication cost, and for
economic feasibility, most of the manufacturing and fabrication is
pushed offshore [5]. However, many offshore fabrication facilities
are considered to be untrusted, which has raised concern over po-
tential attacks in the manufacturing supply chain, with an intimate
knowledge of the fabrication process, the ability to modify and ex-
pand the design prior to production, and an unavoidable access to
the fabricated chips during testing. Hence, fabrication in untrusted
fabs has introduced multiple forms of security threats from supply
chain including that of overproduction, Trojan insertion, Reverse
Engineering, Intellectual Property (IP) theft, and counterfeiting [7].
To prevent the adversaries from such attacks, researchers have
proposed various obfuscation methods for hiding and/or locking the
functionality of an netlist. However, the validity and strength of logic
obfuscation to defend an IP against adversaries in the manufacturing
supply chain was seriously challenged as researchers demonstrated
that the de-obfuscation attacks leveraging satisfiability (SAT) solvers
[13][6] combined with Signal Probability Skew (SPS) attacks [16]
could break the existing obfuscation schemes (both locking and
camouflaging) in a relatively short time. Cyclic obfuscation [12]
was another approach that was considered as a defense mechanism
against SAT solvers. However, this technique was later broken by
CycSAT attack [18]. The CycSAT added a pre-analysis step to the
original SAT attack for detection and avoidance of cycles in the netlist
during SAT attack. In this paper, we further investigate the CycSAT
attack and illustrate its pre-processing step has to compose the cycle
avoidance condition by traversing all cycles in a netlist. We illustrate
that by having a small number of methodically constructed feedbacks
in a netlist, an exponentially large number of simple and nested
cycles could be generated in a netlist, and we propose two different
techniques for building such behavior. Since a successful SAT attack
on a cyclic circuit requires the avoidance clauses, and time it takes to
generate such avoidance clauses has an exponential relation with the
number of inserted feedbacks, the CycSAT attack faces exponential
runtime at its processing step. Hence, when deploying the CycSAT,
the complexity of the problem is not in the SAT solver step of the
problem, but in its pre-processing step.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we
cover the background on logic obfuscation. Then in section 3 we
elaborate on the limitation of CycSAT and our approach for breaking
the CycSAT. In section 4 we introduce our techniques for building
an exponential relation between the number of feedbacks and the
number of created cycles in a circuit. We also introduce three mech-
anisms for building a cyclic Boolean function to further increase the
complexity of CycSAT pre-processing step. Our experimental results
are summarized in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND ON LOGIC OBFUSCATION
AND SAT ATTACKS
Logic obfuscation is the process of hiding the functionality of an IP by
building ambiguity or by implementing post manufacturing means
of control and programmability into a netlist. Gate camouflaging
and circuit locking are two of the widely explored obfuscation mech-
anisms [3][17][4] for this purpose. A camouflaged gate is a gate that
after reverse engineering (by means of delayering and lithography)
could be mapped to any member of a possible set of gates or may
look like one logic gate (e.g., AND), however functionally perform
as another (e.g., XOR). In locking solutions, the functionality of a
circuit is locked using a number of key inputs such that only when a
correct key is applied, the circuit resumes its expected functionality.
Otherwise, the correct function is hidden among many of the 2K
(K being the number of keys) circuit possibilities. The claim raised
by such obfuscation scheme was that to break the obfuscation, an
adversary needs to try a large number of inputs and key combina-
tions to extract the correct key, and the difficulty of this process
increases exponentially as the number of keys and primary inputs
increases. Hence, if enough gates are obfuscated, an adversary faces
an unacceptably long time (claimed as years to decades) to break
the obfuscation scheme. Note that the availability of scan chains
(for DFT), allows an adversary to access combinational logic in each
stage of a sequential circuit, load the desired input, execute the stage
for one cycle, and readout the output.
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The validity and strength of logic obfuscation to defend the IP
against adversaries in the manufacturing supply chain was seriously
challenged as researchers demonstrated that the satisfiability (SAT)
solvers, when formulated according to Algorithm 1, could break the
obfuscation (both locking and camouflaging) in a matter of minutes
as opposed to the promised claim of years and decades [13][6]. As
illustrated in algorithm 1, to employ a SAT attack, the obfuscated
circuit is transformed into a circuit SAT problem, in which the SAT
solver looks for an input value X for which the obfuscated circuit
produces two different outputs for two different input keys. Such key
is referred to as a Discriminating Input XDI . Each time a new XDI
is found, the circuit SAT is updated to make sure that the next two
keys that will be found in the next iteration of SAT solver invocation,
produce the same output for all previously discovered XDI . This is
done by building a Discriminating Input Validation Circuit (DIVC)
as illustrated in algorithm 1. When the SAT solver can no longer find
a XDI , the DIVC circuit contains a complete set of discriminating
inputs. At this point, any key that satisfies the DIVC (by calling a
SAT solver on this circuit) is the key to the obfuscated circuit [13][6].
Algorithm 1 SAT Attack on Obfuscated Circuits
1: DIVC = 1;
2: SATcircut = C(X , K1, Y1) ∧C(X , K2, Y2) ∧ (Y1 , Y2);
3: while ((XDI , K1, K2) ← SATF (SATcircut ) = T ) do
4: Yf ← CBlackBox (XDI );
5: DIVC = DIVC ∧C(XDI , K1, Yf ) ∧C(XDI , K2, Yf );
6: SATcircut = SATcircut ∧ DIVC ;
7: KeyGenCircuit = DIVC ∧ (K1 = K2)
8: Key ← SATF (KeyGenCircuit )
This reevaluation redirected the attention of the researchers to
find harder obfuscation schemes that are more resilient to SAT at-
tacks. SARLock and Anti-SAT [15][14] obfuscation methods were
proposed for this purpose, however further research proved that
these obfuscation techniques are prone to a simple removal attack
after identification of these blocks using Signal Probability Skew
(SPS) attack [16], or identification of most key values using approx-
imate SAT attacks [11], leaving the problem of finding a SAT and
SPS resilient obfuscation still unresolved.
A different direction for obfuscating a netlist was proposed in [12]
where by introducing feedbacks in the netlist, the netlist is no longer
a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). In their approach each intentionally
created cycle had more than one way to be opened, making such
cycle irreducible by structural analysis, claiming that the existence
of such cycle breaks the original SAT attack in [13][6]. This cyclic
obfuscation was later broken with the introduction of CycSAT attack
in [18]. In CycSAT attack, before invoking the SAT solver, the netlist
is checked for key conditions that may result in the creation of cycles.
This conditions are translated to a set of cycle avoidance clauses
and are added to the list of clauses that represent the circuit SAT
problem. The algorithm 2 illustrates the flow of utilizing the cycle
avoidance-clauses in CycSAT attack.
Algorithm 2 CycSAT Attack on Cyclic Obfuscated Circuits
1: Find a set of feedback signals (w0, w1, ...wm );
2: Compute "no structural path" formulas F (w0, w ′0), ..., F (wm, w′m );
3: NC(K ) = ∧mi=0F (wi , w′i )
4: C(X , K, Y ) = C(X , K, Y ) ∧ NC(K )
5: SATcircut = C(X , K1, Y1) ∧C(X , K2, Y2) ∧ (Y1 , Y2);
6: while ((XDI , K1, K2) ← SATF (SATcircut ) = T ) do
7: Yf ← CBlackBox (XDI );
8: DIVC = DIVC ∧C(XDI , K1, Yf ) ∧C(XDI , K2, Yf );
9: SATcircut = SATcircut ∧ DIVC ;
10: KeyGenCircuit = DIVC ∧ (K1 = K2)
11: Key ← SATF (KeyGenCircuit )
x2
Ox1
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Figure 1: (a) Original circuit (b) Flow diagram of the netlist (c)
Obfuscated circuit.
In this algorithm (w0,w1, ...wm ) is a collection of feedback signals
whose break will make the encrypted circuit acyclic andw ′i is a signal
that feeds towi before the break. The function F (wi , j) is a function
that construct the condition for "having no structural path" between
signal wi to signal j. The F (wi , j) is computed by starting from a
feedback signalwi and constructs a string of clauses that satisfy the
following condition while traversing a cycle:
F (wi , j) =
∧
l ∈NK (j)
F (wi , l) ∨ bk(l , j) (1)
In this function, the NK(j) are the non-key inputs of signal j, and
bk(l , j) is the condition on key assuring key does not affect j. This
function is initiated with condition F (wi ,wi ) = 0 and finishes after
completing the loop. In this case, the condition for no structural path
is tested on all discovered feedback signals in line 3 of the algorithm.
3 BREAKING CYCSAT
The computation for F (wi , j) could be done in two ways: (i) travers-
ing through a cycle starting from wi until wi is visited again and
ignoring the cycle break conditions imposed by fanins of other nested
cycles; or (ii) traversing through one cycle and adding the cycle break
conditions imposed by other nested cycle. We demonstrate that the
first choice results in missing some NC conditions, leaving cycles
in a design that could break the SAT solver, and by choosing the
condition (2) we are forced to build the NC condition by visiting all
cycles in the netlist.
Considering the obfuscated netlist in Fig. 1 and a topological sort
from gate A, the edge E and F are identified as feedbacks. When
following rule (i), and building the NC condition we will have:
1: F (F , A) = F (F , F ) ∨ bk (k1) = k′1
2: F (F , F ′) = F (F , A) ∨ bk (k2) = k′1 ∨ k2
3: F (E, C) = F (E, E) ∨ bk (k2) = k′2
4: F (E, E′) = F (E, C) ∨ bk (k3) = k′2 ∨ k′3
5: NC = F (F , F ′) ∧ F (E, E′) = (k′1 ∨ k2) ∧ (k′2 ∨ k′3)
The problem with this assignment is when (k1,k2,k3) = (0, 1, 0).
In this case, the NC condition is satisfied, however, the larger nested
cycle EFGE is not broken. Hence, the NC condition would not resolve
the cycles if nested or multi-path scenarios exist. In this case, if the
wrong key (k1,k2,k3) = (0, 1, 0) is chosen by SAT solver, it will enter
a loop. Depending on whether the cycle is stateful or oscillating, the
SAT solver will either be trapped in an infinite loop or will exit with
an incorrect key assignment. Note that this infinite loop happens
during the execution of the SAT solver and not during the topological
sort used in the original SAT attack proposed in [13][6].
To avoid the problem imposed by rule (i), we need to follow the
rule (ii) where the key contribution of all fanins in all stages are
considered. When using rule (ii) for building the NC condition for
the same circuit we have:
1: F (F , A) = F (F , F ) ∨ bk (k1) = k′1
2: F (F , F ′) = (F (F , A) ∨ bk (k2)) ∧ (F (F , E) ∨ bk (k2)) = (k′1 ∨ k2) ∧ (k′1 ∨ k3 ∨ k′2)
3: F (E, C) = F (E, E) ∨ bk (k2) = k′2
4: F (E, E′) = (F (E, C) ∨ bk (k3)) ∧ (F (E, G) ∨ bk (k3)) = (k′2 ∨ k′3) ∧ (k′2 ∨ k′1 ∨ k3)
5: NC = F (C, C′) ∧ F (E, E′) = (k′2 ∨ k′3) ∧ (k′1 ∨ k′2 ∨ k3) ∧ (k′1 ∨ k2).
2
. By following rule (ii), the previous assignment of keys (k1,k2,k3) =
(0, 1, 0) will no longer be a valid assignment, preventing the SAT
solver from being stuck or suggesting a wrong key. However, in this
case, all cycles in the design have to be traversed and conditioned. As a
matter of fact, given the way the NC is formulated in [18], in order to
derive the "no structural path" condition, some of the combinational
cycles (such as EFGE in Fig. 1) have been visited more than once.
Hence, the number of times the key conditions has to be generated
is even larger than the number of cycles in a netlist.
The problem of visiting nested cycles more than once in a CycSAT
attack could be resolved by a slight modification to the CycSAT pre-
processing step. In the modified attack, instead of applying rule (ii)
on one-cycle-per feedback, we could apply the rule (i) on all cycles. It
is intuitive to see that both approaches produce the same NC clauses.
For example, in Fig. 1 when following condition (i), and travers-
ing cycle EFGE, the condition (k ′1 ∨ k ′2 ∨ k3) is generated. Hence,
by ANDing the generated condition to the two clauses generated
by applying the rule (i), the NC condition of rule (ii) is generated.
However, in this case, the combinational cycle EFGE is only visited
once. Even by considering the improvement suggested in CycSAT
formulation, it still requires visiting all cycles in a netlist to compose
the NC clauses. This necessity is used to break the CycSAT attack in
this paper.
A different method of introducing complexity is by eliminating
DAG nature of the original netlist and by transforming it into a
Boolean cyclic function, which could be represented using a Directed
Cyclic Graph (DCG), before subjecting it to cyclic obfuscation. If
the original netlist is not a DAG, the CycSAT pre-processing step
has to build the NC condition by checking for "no sensitizable path"
condition [18], instead of "no structural path" condition. The no
sensitizable path condition from [18] is recited in equation 2:
F (wi , j) =
∧
l ∈f anin(j)
F (wi , l) ∨ ns(l , j) (2)
The "no sensitizable path" condition generates a clause for each
multi-input gate in a cycle. As the result, NC clauses are much
longer and much weaker. Hence, adding even a small number of
feedbacks to such circuits (that have valid Boolean cycles) for the
purpose of obfuscation, will significantly increase the size of the
circuitSAT problem. To illustrate the weaker and longer nature of
the NC clauses, the no "sensitizable path condition" for the circuit in
Fig. 1 is constructed below:
1: F (F , A) = F (F , F ) ∨ ns(F , A) = k′1
2: F (F , B) = F (F , A) ∨ ns(A, B) = k′1 ∨ x ′2
3: F (F , F ′) = (F (F , B)∨ns(B, F ′))∧(F (F , E)∨ns(E, F ′)) = (k′1∨x ′2∨k2)∧(k′1∨k3∨k′2)
4: F (E, C) = F (E, E) ∨ ns(E, C) = k′2
5: F (E, D) = F (E, C) ∨ ns(C, D) = k′2
6: F (E, E′) = (F (E, D)∨ns(D, E′))∧(F (E, G)∨ns(G, E′)) = (k′2∨k′3)∧(k′2∨k′1∨x ′2∨k3)
7: NC = F (F , F ′)∧F (E, E′) = (k′1∨x ′2∨k2)∧(k′1∨k3∨k′2)∧(k′2∨k′3)∧(k′2∨k′1∨x ′2∨k3)
The CycSAT pre-processing time, as illustrated in equation 3, is
linearly related to the number of discovered cycles N and the time
for composing the NC condition per cycle tNC . Our approach for
breaking the CycSAT is to exponentially increase the time needed for
composing the NC condition in the pre-processing step of CycSAT
beyond acceptable. This is achieved by exponentially increasing the
number of cyclesN in a designwith respect to the number of inserted
feedbacksm, and increasing the time required for processing each
cycle (tNC ) by forcing the pre-processing step to consider the "no
sensitizable path" condition instead of " no structural path" condition.
TNC =
N∑
i=1
tNC | N = Aem (3)
In the next section we propose two methods for building an expo-
nential relation between the number of cycles in a netlist with the
number of inserted feedbacks and subsequently introduce three tech-
niques for transforming a netlist to contain cyclic Boolean functions
which forces an attacker to use the "no sensitizable path" condition
in CycSAT attack.
4 CYCLIC OBFUSCATION
4.1 Exponentially increasing the number of
cycles in a netlist
In order to exponentially increase the number of cycles in a given
netlist with respect to the number of inserted feedbacks, we introduce
two approaches: (1) building Super Cycles (SC) and, (2) building
Logarithmic Feedback Networks (LFN).
4.1.1 Building Super Cycles (SC). The process of building a
SC is illustrated in Fig. 2. To define and build a SC, let us first define
a Micro Cycle (MC). A MC is a cycle created by following the cycle
creation conditions adopted from [12], which are recited below:
MC Condition 1: Any created cycle has to be non-reducible
MC Condition 2: At least n ≥ 2 edges in each small cycle have to be
removable
(a)
K1
(b)
K4
K1
A B C D
K5 K6 K7 K8
These connections (A, B, C, and D) will be used to create two-way 
connections to their fan-in cones, which is not illustrated in this figure. 
K3
K2
(c)
Figure 2: Building a Super Cycle from 7 gate MC. (a) A path
segment containing 7 gates, (b) building a Micro Cycle, (c)
building a SC by strongly connecting multiple MCs.
A reducible cycle has a single entry point. Hence, the depth-first-
search (DFS) traversal of a netlist, that only contain reducible cycles
is unique allowing reducible cycles to be opened by removing a
unique set of edges which can be found efficiently [12]. By hav-
ing multiple entries into each MC, the non-reducable condition is
satisfied. Combined with having more than one removable edge,
this forces an adversary to use the CycSAT pre-processing step to
generate the necessary cycle avoidance clauses before invoking the
SAT solver. At this point, when each MC is considered as a graph
vertice, a SC is the strongly connected graph of these vertices. In
graph theory, a strongly connected graph is defined as a graph with
at least one path between any two pairs of its vertices. Finally in the
last step, the edge density of the SC is increased, creating additional
paths between MCs. The process of building a SC is captured in
algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Steps for building a Super Cycle
1: Construct MCs in the fanin of smallest possible number of primary outputs.
2: Strongly connect all MC cycles (this is illustrated in Fig. 2.b is done by creating a two-way
connection between each newly created MC, and the existing SC).
3: Select signals in MCs (A, B, C, D in Fig. 2.c) that are not used for SC connectivity and provide a
two way path from them to unused edges in other MCs or random signals in their fanin cone.
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By forcing the MC cycles to the fanin of the smallest number
of primary outputs, we increase the possibility of shared edges or
connecting edges between created MCs. By having all MC cycles
strongly connected, we create the possibility of larger combinational
cycles. And finally, adding the random connections increase the
density of the edges in the strongly connected graph, increasing the
number of resulting cycles. In the result section, we illustrate that
the number of created cycles, by following the steps in algorithm 3
has an exponential relation with the number of inserted feedbacks.
4.1.2 Building Logarithmic Feedback Networks (LFN). In
this method, as illustrated in Fig. 3.a, several path segments in the
fanin cone of the same primary output are selected. By breaking
a signal in the midpoint of each path, two path segments are cre-
ated. The signal entering and the signal exiting each half segment
is marked as its start point (SP) and end point (EP) respectively.
Then the SP and EP of multiple such path segments are used to
build a logarithmic switching network (e.g., Omega, Butterfly, Benes,
or Banyan network). When connecting M EPs to M SPs we need
M(1 + loд2(M)) muxes for a non-blocking logarithmic network. In
this case, when the correct key is applied, the switching network is
configured correctly, otherwise, an invalid connectivity obfuscates
the netlist functionality.
Lemma. The lower bound on the number of cycles created when us-
ing LFN is
∑m
l=1
(m
l
)(l−1)!, whenm is the number of inserted feedbacks
and l is the log base two of the number of cycles of size l .
Proof. The proposed LFN is a special case of a complete bipartite
graph that contains no odd cycles. Suppose that SEi j indicates a
vertex from SPi to EPj . Similarly, ESi j indicates a vertex from EPi to
SPj . For l = 2, the cycles are all paths from a SP to its corresponding
EP and return path {SEii ,ESii }. If we start from SPi , the second
visited node is its EP (EPi ). Since each EP is connected to all SPs , for
intermediate nodes, we have all permutations as possible paths. cy-
cles with l = 2, have no intermediate node. So, there are
(m
1
)
0! cycles
when l = 2. For l = 4, the cycles are paths like {SEii ,ESi j , SEj j ,ESji }.
There is only one intermediate node in cycles when l = 4 result-
ing in
(m
2
)
1! cycles. Similarly, for l = 8, the cycles are paths like
{SEii ,ESi j , SEj j ,ESjk , SEkk ,ESki }. Since, we have two intermedi-
ate node, j and k , we should consider their permutation as a new
cycle, i.e. {SEii ,ESik , SEkk ,ESk j , SEj j ,ESji }. So, for l = 8, we have(m
3
)
2!. We can extend this relation to all cycles with different length.
The summation of these cycles indicates the number of cycles in our
logarithmic network, which is
∑m
l=1
(m
l
)(l − 1)!. ■
I1 SP1A EP1A SP1B EP1B O1
I2 SP2A EP2A SP2B
EP2B O2
(a)
I1
SP1A EP1A
I2
SP1B EP1B
SP2A
SP2B
EP2A
EP2B
O1
O2
(b)
EP1A
EP1B
EP2A
EP2B
SP1A
SP1B
SP2A
SP2B
(c)
Figure 3: Building a logarithmic feedback network in which
the number of cycles exponentially increasewith the number
of feedbacks.
Note that the
∑m
l=1
(m
l
)(l −1)! is the lower bound of the number of
simple and nested cycles created by using the logarithmic network.
As amatter of fact, the number of paths from each SP to each EP could
be more than 1, and there are possibilities of having a connection
between SPs and EPs of the different paths in the original circuit,
increasing the number of cycle possibilities to a far larger number.
Based on the lower bound formula, the number of created cycles
is O(∑ml=1 (ml )(l − 1)!) ≤ O(m!) = O(mm ). Hence, there exists an
exponential relation between the number of inserted feedbacks and
the number of resulting cycles in the netlist.
4.2 Building Cyclic Boolean Functions
A Boolean function does not need to be acyclic; it is possible to
reduce the number of gates in a circuit if a function could be imple-
mented in its acyclic form [2][1][9][10]. For example, the work in
[10] presents an n-input 2n-output positive unate Boolean function
which can be realized with 2n two-input gates when feedback is
used but requires 3n − 2 gates if feedback is not used. Hence, cyclifi-
cation of a circuit in addition to forcing the CycSAT pre-processing
step to consider the "no sensitizable path", could also remedy the
area overhead of introducing new gates for cyclic obfuscation. To
cyclify a netlist and to increase the tNC in equation 3, we suggest
three approaches: (1) Template-based cyclic-function mapping, (2)
Input-dependency based cycle generation and, (3) Node-merging
based cycle generation.
x2
x3
x1
Figure 4: 3-input Rivest circuit implementing six functions.
4.2.1 Template-based cyclic-function mapping. In this ap-
proach, many small cyclic Boolean circuits are collected as templates
in our obfuscation library. Then, A netlist is scanned for opportu-
nities (with and without logic manipulation) to replace a cluster of
logic gates with such templates. An example of such feedback tem-
plate is the circuit introduced in [10] where a special case of it (for 3
inputs) is illustrated in Fig. 4. To introduce cycles, the circuit could
be modified to introduce at least one of the possible functions in this
circuit. The candidate logic cluster is then replaced by the template.
To prevent template scanning and removal attacks, in a subsequent
camouflaging step (by means of gate and route obfuscation) the
template will be hidden. Note that many such templates could be
made [10][2][1][9], and by not knowing the template type and the
camouflaged technique used to hide the connection, an attacker has
no prior information to identify and remove these templates.
Logic 
Cone 1
(L1)
Logic Cone 3
(L3)
A
B
C
Logic 
Cone 2
(L2)
D
ValidA B C D
0 0 0 0
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1 1 1 1
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Logic Cone 1
(L1)
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D
0 0 1 0
Not 
ValidA B C D
.
.
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.
.
.
Figure 5: Due to correlation of intermediate signals, certain
signal combinations may never occur.
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Figure 6: Input-dependency-based cyclification of a Boolean function. (a) SR latch (b) original circuit (c) cyclified circut when
ABCD = 0010 is non-occuring. (d) obfuscated cyclified circuit using additonal random inputs E, F ,G,H andM .
4.2.2 Input-dependencybased cycle generation. Thismethod
explores the correlations between signals that share common pri-
mary inputs in their fanin cone. Considering N such signals in an
arbitrary stage of a DAG, some of the 2N input possibilities may
never occur. For example, when tracking 4 signals A, B, C , and D
in Fig. 5, we may find that ABCD = {0010} could not occur. A SAT
solver cold be used for finding the non-occurring input scenarios;
This process is illustrated in Fig. 5, where the logic clusters L2 and
L3 are removed, and the 4 signals are ANDed together such that
for a certain case, for example, ABCD = 0010, the output of AND
gate is evaluated to 1. Then, this circuit is given to a SAT solver to
find a satisfying input assignment. If SAT solver returns UNSAT,
this combination of input is chosen since it would never happen,
otherwise, a different combination is checked.
In the next step, we use a sequential element and tie the discovered
non-occurring input scenario to the state preserving input of the
sequential element. For example, by using SR latch in Fig. 6.a, If
SR = 11 doesn’t happen, the Qnext is the inverse of input S . Hence,
we can build a circuit that ties the discovered non-occurring input
scenario to the SR = 11. For example, let’s assume wires A, B, C
and D have a non-occurring combination ABCD = 0010 and these
signals construct the signal Y = A + B + CD. Fig 6.c illustrates
the signal Y reconstructed when the non-occurring combination of
the inputs is tied to SR input of the latch. In the next step, to hide
the correlation between input signals, they are further obfuscated.
The SR latch feedback is also obfuscated using a set of muxes that
create alternative paths for its feedback signals. This assures that
the CycSAT can only generate the correct NC clauses if the "no
sensitizable path" condition is processed, otherwise, it breaks the SR
latch feedback and invalidates the netlist.
4.2.3 Node-merging based cycle generation. The third ap-
proach for cyclification of a netlist is based on the work in [2] where
the logic implication is used to identify cyclifiable structure candi-
dates directly, or to create them aggressively in circuits. At its core,
the work in [2] introduces active combinational feedback cycles by
merging two nodes in the original DAG. To check the validity of the
generated cyclic netlist, they use a SAT-based algorithm and validate
whether the formed cycles are combinational or not.
5 RESULTS
In this section, we analyze the effectiveness of our proposed defense
against SAT and CycSAT attacks. For finding the list of cycles in
a netlist after cyclic obfuscation, the algorithm in [8] was imple-
mented in C++. Our computational platform is a Dell PowerEdge
R620 equipped with Intel Xeon E5-2670 2.50GHz and 64GB of RAM.
We have used our proposed Super Cycle scheme for exponentially
increasing the number of cycles on ISCAS-85 benchmarks, and the
input-dependency-based netlist cyclification for forcing the CycSAT
pre-processing to use the "no sensitizable path" condition instead of
"no structural path" condition. However, similar results are observed
when LFN is deployed, or other proposed techniques (template-based
cyclification, and node-merging) are used for cyclification of a netlist.
Table 1: SAT-attack and CycSAT execution time after inser-
tion of a SC (N=2) and insertion of a SC and 10 SR latches
(N=2 + SR-L=10).
Circuit N=2 N=2 + SR-L=10
SAT #Cycles CycSAT-I SAT #Cycles CycSAT-I CycSAT-II
c432 Inf Loop 23,879 2.561 s Inf Loop 1.65 × 105 UNSAT 11.691 s
c499 0.56 s 236 0.104 s Inf Loop 397 UNSAT 0.118 s
c880 Inf Loop 1,601 0.245 s Inf Loop 7.87 × 106 UNSAT 793.125 s
c1355 Inf Loop 636 0.122 s Inf Loop 5.00 × 105 UNSAT 53.215 s
c1908 0.28 s 294 0.101 s Inf Loop 6,467 UNSAT 0.732 s
c2670 Inf Loop 1,570 0.234 s Inf Loop 7,412 UNSAT 0.927 s
c3540 Inf Loop 5,991 0.756 s Inf Loop 6,026 UNSAT 0.753 s
c5315 Inf Loop 4,869 0.613 s Inf Loop 2.59 × 105 UNSAT 26.042 s
c7552 Inf Loop 124 0.189 s Inf Loop 164 UNSAT 0.195 s
Table 1 captures the behavior of SAT and CycSAT when dealing
with obfuscated cyclic and acyclic netlists. For generating the data
in this table, we have created a cyclic version of each ISCAS-85
benchmark using input-dependency based obfuscation proposed in
section 4.2.2, and then implemented a super cycle with two MCs in
each netlist. The pure SAT attack is trapped in an infinite loop in both
cases, with an exception of two benchmarks, that SAT solver luckily
chooses a sequence of keys that avoid or exit the trap. The CycSAT
when uses the "no structural path" condition (CycSAT-I) for the
acyclic circuit, breaks the obfuscation easily, however, as illustrated
in this table and predicted in equation 3, its runtime (which include
the runtime for both pre-processing step and SAT solver’s invocation)
almost linearly varies with the number of cycles in each netlist. But
when the netlist is acyclic, CycSAT-I returns UNSAT as it produces
NC clause that breaks the DCG cycles incorrectly. On the other
hand, the CycSAT when uses the "no sensitizable path" condition
(CycSAT-II), breaks the obfuscation in all cases. However, since the
number of created cycles are larger, and the time it takes to compose
the NC condition for each cycle based on "no sensitizable path"
condition is longer, the runtime of the SAT solver is considerably
longer. In short, this table shows the capabilities of SAT, and CycSAT
(I and II) for dealing with cyclic and acyclic original netlists, and
also express the linear dependence between the CycSAT runtime
and the number of created cycles. Hence, if the number of cycles
exponentially increase, the runtime of CycSAT (pre-processing step)
also exponentially increase.
The number of cycles created in ISCAS-85 benchmarks, when
adding N=1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 15 and 20 MCs of size 7 (i.e., 7 gates in
Table 2: The number of cycles reported during CycSAT attack.
The exponential fitting function is in form of y = AeBx .
Circuit N=1 N=2 N=3 N=5 N=10 N=15 N=20 Exponential Fit Function
c432 3,384 23,879 2.54 × 106 N/A N/A N/A N/A –
c499 10 236 397 55,585 N/A N/A N/A –
c880 67 1,601 1,903 8.22 × 106 Timeout Timeout Timeout A=881.953, B=1.75536
c1355 59 636 5.67 × 106 1.96 × 109 Timeout Timeout Timeout A=21.7956, B=3.66316
c1908 13 294 12,594 1.33 × 107 Timeout Timeout Timeout A=0.00174972, B=4.59814
c2670 273 1,570 8,912 2.90 × 105 Timeout Timeout Timeout A=1036.51, B=1.82463
c3540 1,215 5,991 8.69 × 106 4.98 × 108 Timeout Timeout Timeout A=4.0758, B=3.72457
c5315 162 4,869 6,650 1.22 × 109 Timeout Timeout Timeout A=0.0217371, B=4.95008
c7552 11 124 1,558 2.57 × 105 1.15 × 109 Timeout Timeout A=9191.65, B=1.10724
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Table 3: Area overhead of SCs versus number of used MCs.
#MCs N=1 N=2 N=3 N=5 N=10 N=15 N=20
#Gates 6 11 16 26 51 76 101
a cycle), while building a super cycle is reported in Table 2. As
illustrated, the number of cycles created from implementing a super
cycle is primarily a function of the number of inserted feedbacks and
secondarily a function of the topology of starting netlist. As expected,
the number of cycles is aggressively increased by the addition of
each MC to the SC. Since the number of created cycles is also a
function of topology, no single equation could predict the exact
exponential growth for all benchmarks. Hence, using curve fitting
techniques, the number of created cycles in each netlist as a function
of the number of feedbacks is also reported in this table. As expected
in all cases we see an exponential relation between the number of
feedbacks and the number of created cycles. In smaller circuits like
c432 and c499, there were not enough gates to create the required
MCs for larger super cycles, hence, N/A is reported. For timeout
entries, the number of cycles was not determined after 10 hours of
execution on our server node. For executions resulted in timeout
we also confirmed that initiating the CycSAT with incomplete NC
clauses traps the SAT solver in an infinite loop. As illustrated in Table.
2, this is the case for most of the circuits with more than 10 MCs. The
area overhead for building the SC in terms of the number of needed
switches depends on the number of MCs and the number of gates in
each MC. The area overhead for having various number of MCs of
size 7 gates when building a SC is reported in Table 3. In short, as
the number of inserted feedbacks increases, the pre-processing step
of CycSAT faces an exponential increase in its runtime. Hence, by
introducing a reasonable number of feedbacks using a methodology
that exponentially increases the number of cycles (such as SC or
LFN as proposed in this paper), the netlist could be protected against
both SAT and CycSAT attacks by means of cyclic obfuscation.
Table 4: Number of cycles in c1908 circuit after inserting dif-
ferent number of cycles and SR latches.
#MCs
#SR-L 0 1 2 5 10 20
0 0 5 30 245 7,675 7.35 × 106
1 13 189 9,875 4.37 × 106 1.78 × 107 Timeout
2 294 7,574 8.71 × 106 Timeout Timeout Timeout
3 12,594 6.82 × 105 1.42 × 107 Timeout Timeout Timeout
5 1.33 × 107 2.28 × 107 Timeout Timeout Timeout Timeout
10 Timeout Timeout Timeout Timeout Timeout Timeout
Table 4 illustrates the strength of cyclic obfuscation when a netlist
(c1908 in ISCAS-85) is first cyclified and then is subjected to cyclic
obfuscation. For netlist cyclification, the input-dependency-based
technique in section 4.2.2 is used, and for exponentially increasing
the number of cycles with respect to number of feedbacks, the SC
approach was used. After adding 5 SR-latches and only two MCs, list
of cycles could not be generated under 10 hour time limit. This will
again prevent the initiation of SAT-attack because cycle avoidance
clauses could not be generated. In short, cyclification of a netlist
before subjecting it to cyclic obfuscation could increase the runtime
of CycSAT pre-processing step exponentially.
6 CONCLUSION
By introducing cycles in a netlist, the straightforward SAT-attack
would be trapped in an infinite loop while CycSAT can solve such
obfuscation problems. However, the problem with CycSAT is the
runtime of its pre-processing step for generating the cycle avoidance
clauses, which grow as a linear function of the number of cycles in
the netlist. As a mean of defense, we introduced several techniques
for exponentially increasing the number of cycles with respect to the
number of inserted feedbacks. This, in turn, resulted in an exponen-
tial increase in runtime of CycSAT pre-processing step, disabling the
SAT attack to be carried in a reasonable amount of time. Based on
this study, the cyclic obfuscation when properly implemented poses
an exponential runtime on CycSAT attack with respect to the num-
ber of inserted feedbacks. Hence, CycSAT or existing SAT-attacks
are not an effective mean for breaking cyclic obfuscation.
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